Evidence: Prior Inconsistent Statements as Substantive Evidence by Greenwood, Richard Glen
Marquette Law Review
Volume 41
Issue 3 Winter 1957-1958 Article 8
Evidence: Prior Inconsistent Statements as
Substantive Evidence
Richard Glen Greenwood
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Richard Glen Greenwood, Evidence: Prior Inconsistent Statements as Substantive Evidence, 41 Marq. L. Rev. 317 (1958).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol41/iss3/8
RECENT DECISIONS
Evidence: Prior Inconsistent Statements as Substantive Evi-
dence - In the current case of State v. Major,' the accused was found
guilty of unlawful possession and sale of narcotics in violation of secs.
161.02(1)2 and 161.02(2)s of the statutes. On the trial one Hector X.
Santoy, a witness called by the State, testified that he never saw or
talked to the accused on the date of the alleged offense. This testimony
was inconsistent with a previous stenographically recorded statement
made by Santoy to two Milwaukee police officers in accordance with
sec. 325.354 of the statutes. This recorded statement was to the effect
that the accused possessed and sold narcotics to Santoy. Santoy ad-
mitted that he made the previous statement to the officers and volun-
teered:
"About that testimony [statement] I gave, well, it is false
because the only reason I gave it was because I thought I could
get off easier if I would blame anybody." 5
The State then asked the court to declare Santoy a hostile witness
and the court over objection permitted the district attorney to read
into the record certain portions of the statement and examine the wit-
ness on the questions and answers contained therein. The defendant
was found guilty and then moved for a new trial which was denied.
The defendant was thereupon sentenced and he then appealed to the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its former position
in holding with the orthodox view by announcing:
"This court has long adhered to the majority rule that pre-
vious inconsistent statements of a witness cannot be accorded
any value as substantive evidence.""
On appeal it was the State's position that the trial court's ruling
I State v. Major, 274 Wis. 110, 79 N.W.2d 75 (1956).
2 WIs. STATS. §161.02 (1) (1955) : "It shall be unlawful for any person to man-
ufacture, possess, have control of, buy, sell, give away, prescribe, administer.
dispense or compound any narcotic drug, except as authorized in this chapter.
Any person violating this section shall upon conviction be imprisoned in the
state prison not more than 5 years nor less than one year or in the countyjail not more than one year."
3 Wis. STATS. §161.02 (2) (1955): "Any person who shall sell, give, prescribe,
administer or dispense any narcotic drug, except as authorized in this chapter,
to any person under the age of 21 years, shall be imprisoned in the state pri-
son not less than 3 years nor more than 25 years, provided that on a second
conviction for such offense such person shall be imprisoned for not less than
5 years nor more than for life and for a third conviction for such offense
such person shall be imprisoned for life."
SVIs. STATS. §325.35 (1955): "Where testimony of a witness on the trial in a
criminal action is inconsistent with a statement previously made by him and
reduced to writing and approved by him or taken by a phonographic reporter,
he may, in the discretion of the court, be regarded as a hostile witness and
eamined as an adverse witness, and the party producing him may impeach him
by evidence of such prior contradictory statement."
5274 Wis. at 111, 79 N.W.2d at 76.
6 Hamilton v. Reinemann, 233 Wis. 572, 290 N.W. 194 (1940) ; Jaster v. filler,
269 Wis. 223, 69 N.W.2d 265 (1955).
7274 Wis. at 112, 79 N.W.2d at 77.
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was a proper application of sec. 325.35.8 It was urged by the State
that sec. 325.351 was a legislative expansion of the procedure reviewed
in Malone v. State.'0 In disposing of this argument the court stated:
"In a criminal action examination of a hostile witness as an
adverse witness allows the prosecutor to examine without being
bound by the witness' answers and provides the opportunity to
repair the harm done to the State's case by surprise, but the
statute shows no intention on the part of the legislature to allow
hearsay evidence to be considered as proof of the facts. The
creation of sec. 325.35 Stats., by the enactment of Ch. 535,
Laws of 1945, in no way changed the rule of evidence. In
enacting the chapter the legislature declared it to be an act
relating to the impeachment of hostile witnesses in criminal
actions. Impeachment goes only to the credibility of the witness
and the negation of his testimony."'"
In light of this recent reaffirmation by the Court of the "orthodox"
or "prevailing view" it is of merit to consider the evidentiary me-
chanics of both positions. A concise statement of the orthodox view
is that:
"Proof of prior inconsistent statements of a witness can be
introduced and considered only for the purpose of impeachment
and not as substantive evidence of the truth of the matter stated,
and it is the duty of the court to instruct the jury that they can
consider the evidence for this purpose only, if such instruction
is requested by the party who apprehends that such proof may
be treated by the jury as substantive evidence against him." 2
The rationale employed to deny substantive effect to prior inconsistent
statements of a witness is that if such statements were accepted as
proof of the facts stated, the testimony would be hearsay.13 It would
appear that if the prior inconsistent statement were not hearsay or if
it would fall within the standard exceptions to the hearsay rule, there
would be no reason for denying substantive admission of the statement.
The view espoused by Dean Wigmore14 and corroborated by Pro-
fessor McCormick" is commonly considered the "unorthodox view."
Dean Wigmore declares:
"It does not follow, however, that prior self-contradictions,
when admitted, are to be treated as having no affirmative testi-
monial value and that any such credit is to be strictly denied
s See note 4 supra.
9 Ibid.
10 Malone v. State, 192 Wis. 379, at 388, 212 N.W. 879, at 882 (1927).
1274 Wis. at 113, 79 N.W.2d at 78.
12 Charlton v. Unis, 4 Gratt 60 (1847) ; Gould v. Norfolk Lead Co., 9 Cush.
346 (1855). See 70 C. J., Witnesses §1339b (1935).
'1 Culpepper v. State, 4 Okl. Cr. 103, 11 P. 679 (1903) ; Medlin v. County Bd. of
Education, 167 N.C. 239, 83 S.E. 483 (1914) ; See 70 C. J., Witnesses 1339
(1935).
" See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1018 (a) (3rd ed. 1940).
15 See MIcCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §39 (1954).
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them in the mind of the tribunal. The only ground for doing
so would be the Hearsay Rule. But the theory of the Hearsay
Rule is that an extra-judicial statement is rejected because it was
made out of court by an absent person not subject to cross
examination. . . .Here, however, by hypothesis, the witness is
present and subject to cross examination. There is ample op-
portunity to test him as to the basis of his former statement.
The whole purpose of the Hearsay Rule has already been
satisfied. Hence there is nothing to prevent the tribunal from
giving such testimonial credit to the extra-judicial statement
as it may seem to deserve."",
It is apparent that Dean Wigmore has omitted the elemental objection
that the statement must be made under oath to qualify as non-hearsay,
however, Dean Wigmore found support for his view in such an
eminent jurist as Learned Hand. Justice Hand, speaking relative to
this matter, argued for a change in this regard:
"The possibility that the jury may accept as the truth the
earlier statements in preference to those made upon the stand
is indeed real, but we find no difficulty in it. If, from all that
the jury see of the witness, they conclude that what he says now
is not the truth, but what he said before, they are nonetheless
deciding from what they see and hear of that person and in
court. There is no mythical necessity that the case must be
decided only in accordance with the truth of words uttered
under oath in court."'"
The best analytical dissection of the "unorthodox view" can be
found in State v. SaporenW' in which the legal issue and facts closely
parallel that of the featured case."9 In that case the accused was con-
victed of carnal knowledge and abuse of a female under 18 years.
The main question was one of identification which the jury resolved
against the accused. The point arose from the State's impeachment
of its own witness, one Sekerman. The date of the offense was fixed
by the State's evidence as Nov. 2, 1937 in room 201 of a boarding
house. Sekerman was called in rebuttal by the State and asked if he
had seen the prosecuting witness in room 201. He answered that he
had seen her and when interrogated as to the date he replied, "I
think it was in October." He was asked whether he would say it was
not Nov. 2nd and he answered "Yes." The county attorney claimed
surprise and he was given leave to impeach the witness which he did
by reference to a previous unsworn statement, by way of question
and answer, procured by a probation officer with the assistance of a
stenographer. The Court reversed this conviction of the accused
basing its decision on the mijority view that such impeaching testi-
16 See note 13 supra.
17 Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, at 368 (2d Cir. 1925).
18 State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939).
19 See note 1 supra.
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mony cannot be considered as substantive evidence. The Court con-
sidering the "unorthodox view" of Dean Wigmore remarked:
"The previous statement was when made and remains an
ex parte affair, given without oath and test of cross examination.
Important also is the fact that, however much it may have
mangled truth, there was assurance of freedom from prosecu-
tion for perjury. The chief merit of cross examination is not
that at some future time it gives the party opponent the right
to dissect adverse testimony. Its principal virtue is in its im-
mediate application of the testing process. Its strokes fall
while the iron is hot. False testimony is apt to harden and
become unyielding to the blows of truth in proportion as the
witness has opportunity for reconsideration and influence by
the suggestion of others, whose interest may be, and often is to
maintain falsehood rather than truth."20
The Court further remarked that there are additional practical rea-
sons for not attaching anything of substantive evidential value to extra
judicial assertions which come in only as impeachment. It was urged
that such unrestricted use as evidence would increase both temptation
and opportunity for the manufacture of evidence and declarations
extracted by the most extreme of "third degree" methods could easily
be made into affirmative evidence. 21
It is the conclusion of this writer that the ratio decidendi of the
orthodox view in this matter is preferable. Although the Wisconsin
Court in the featured case did not give a detailed consideration to both
positions, it is submitted that the Minnesota Court's reasoning in the
Saporen case, is sound. Obviously any prior inconsistent statement
which violates the rule against hearsay, that is: (1) is not made under
oath; (2) is made without the opportunity for cross examination;
(3) is made without confrontation, would be inadmissible as sub-
stantive evidence. However, even if the statement would be non-
hearsay or fall within its exceptions, it would seem that for the policy
reason of discouraging the manufacture of evidence, it would be more
practical to exclude the prior inconsistent statement as substantive
evidence.
RICHARD GLEN GREENWOOD
Constitutional Law: Obscenity Not Within the Area of Con-
stitutionally Protected Speech or Press- In case No. 582, on cer-
tiorari to the United State Supreme Court, the defendant conducted
a business in New York in the publication and sale of books, photo-
graphs, and magazines. Circulars and advertising matters were used
to solicit sales. Defendant was convicted by a jury in the District
Court for the Southern District of New York upon four counts of a
o See note 17 supra.
21 Ibid.
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